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and animate a series of discussions on educational design-based 
research. In particular, we focus on the overall meaning that the 
notions of intervention and theory can acquire. What concerns 
the former, phronesis helps avoid interpreting intervention as 
the making of an object, be it a learning environment, an appli-
cation, a piece of software. Conversely, it posits that interventi-
on can be fruitfully located within teachers’ professional judg-
ment. The specific focus on professional judgment helps point 
to a different conception of “theory”, which does not revolve 
around the development of generalized principles informing the 
practice. Conversely, theory can be viewed as the effort to ar-
ticulate teachers’ experiences in the form of stories “from the 
field”.
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A phronetic approach to educatio-
nal design-based research: Issues 
and aspirations 
Emanuele Bardone | Merja Bauters
Introduction
The main aim of this paper is to offer a discussion concerning 
educational design-based research (EDBR) in the light of the 
Aristotelian notion of phronesis. Specifically, this paper is a the-
oretical attempt to illustrate how the notion of phronesis may 
provide a fruitful viewpoint to trigger and animate a series of 
discussions revolving around the notion of intervention and that 
of theory, which we take as the two pillars of the educational de-
sign-based research approach. Such discussions provide insight 
into the way in which we interpret, and thus accept, how these 
two notions may lead to different and competitive ways to look 
at educational research and their role in society. Bringing alter-
native and competitive interpretations to the fore enriches the 
current debate and, indeed, shows the potential of the educati-
onal design-based research approach. 
The paper is divided into three main sections. The first section 
provides the historical background in which our contribution 
is situated. As we will show in the opening section, educatio-
nal research is (still) very much a “contested field” of research. 
The reason is that it is somehow caught in between, on the one 
hand, the aspiration to be a rigorous science and, on the other, 
the necessity to contribute in a meaningful way to a practical, 
value-laden, hands-on practice such as education. We argue 
that the notion of phronesis articulates a proposal worth con-
sidering. In a nutshell, the whole idea of phronesis opposes the 
view that the practice of education can be approached with 
the kind of objective rigor characteristic of a Newtonian kind of 
science (or the idealized image we can derive from it). Phronesis 
specifically addresses the inevitable tension between the gene-
ral and the particular. For it points to the importance of practiti-
oners’ first-hand experience and the centrality of their judgment 
necessitated by the uncertainty and contingency of the practice.
In a way, educational design-based research can be considered 
an attempt to face the never-ending controversy concerning 
how to frame the relations between theory and practice. Placing 
a greater emphasis on educational interventions and the prin-
ciples concerning how to design them, educational design-ba-
sed research has already posed the questions concerning how 
educational research can be practical. In this sense, the notion 
of phronesis may help broaden the current debate. Specifically, 
our main intention is to show that educational design-based re-
search can be considered as a practical approach rather than an 
applied one.
In the second and third section we try to see the meaning in-
tervention and theory could acquire, if we looked at them in 
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the light of phronesis. The main idea we develop in the second 
section is how the notion of intervention should not be mista-
ken for the design of a particular product meant to (allegedly) 
increase the efficacy of learning. Conversely, we will argue for 
re-locating intervention into teachers’ professional judgment, 
which is viewed as a direct response to the type of contingency 
that teachers together with students face in everyday situations 
– where education happens. In other words, intervention opens 
up a phronetic space in which teachers are called to apply pro-
fessional judgment in particular and unique situations. 
In the third section, we address the meaning that the notion of 
theory may acquire within such a framework. We will argue, and 
try to support, how theory should not necessarily come in the 
form of law-like principles informing the practice. Theory may 
constitute an attempt to articulate and communicate experien-
ces that practitioners have actually lived, in a way so as to gene-
rate what Robert Stake called “naturalistic generalizations”. That 
is, accounts or cases that the reader can try to relate to their 
own situation in order to see how to act wisely.
Caught in between theory and practice. The contested field 
of educational research
From episteme to phronesis 
In the last twenty years or so, several educational researchers 
belonging to the English-speaking community have posed the 
question related to the practical relevance as well as the impli-
cations of educational research for practitioners, notably, tea-
chers (Winch et al., 2015). This view was voiced by those rese-
archers who tried to react in a constructive way to the various 
lamentations concerning the products of educational research, 
which became a contested field. The discussion that followed 
addressed questions that concern the foundation of educational 
research and its practical role, which stretches back to Dewey’s 
seminal work The Sources of a Science of Education, originally 
published in 1929.
One way in which the issue was posed is in terms of scientific 
rigor. This has been put forward, among others, by Hargreaves 
(1996 and 1999) and it states that, if we want educational re-
search to count, it should be based on a model of knowledge 
production analogous to the so-called hard sciences, which is 
based on “evidence”. According to Hargreaves, the main role of 
educational research is to provide practitioners with evidence 
proving that, for instance, a learning environment, one pedago-
gical method or framework is actually more effective than ano-
ther. Evidence should therefore be decisive and conclusive for 
practice (Elliott, 2001). Which means that educational research 
should focus on what works as opposed to what Hargreaves ter-
med “a hermit stance”. According to which the researcher with-
draws from the messiness of the practice to provide general re-
flections, which Hargreaves felt to be “obscurities masquerading 
as profundities” (Hargreaves, 1999, p. 243). 
2.0
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According to this evidence-based stance, we may say that the-
ory informs practice by providing the law-like statements that 
would then guide the practice of education. As such, educati-
onal research is viewed as a body of knowledge that comes to 
prescribe the way in which practitioners should deal with their 
work. The prescriptive validity of such a body of knowledge is 
granted by the way in which it has been constructed, by the ri-
gorous application of the scientific method. The answer to the 
issue concerning how to make educational research more rele-
vant is therefore addressed by appealing to the rigor in devi-
sing experimental situations, collecting and analysing data that 
allows researchers to make valid and therefore prescribable 
claims concerning the effectiveness of different options.
What is interesting here is that the gap between theory and re-
search, on the one hand, and practice, on the other, is not solved 
by moving the former closer to the latter, but by making a stron-
ger plea for the epistemic constituents of educational research. 
In other words, to increase its practical relevance educational 
research should be more “scientific”, where the word “scienti-
fic” generally appeals to the type of research corresponding to 
an ideal version of what is done in the natural sciences. It follows 
that the pair “theory and research” is practical in the sense that 
the results are applicable and applied to the practice of educati-
on. So, theory and research come to engage practice by guiding 
it in a top-down fashion. Thus, the educational research can be 
considered an applied science. It should be noted that this is not 
anything new in the history of educational research. It is a recur-
rent theme that has characterized the history of the discipline 
almost since its academic establishment, and as such it concerns 
the whole spectrum of the social sciences.
In contrast to this, a number of educationalists have presented 
a different stance (for instance, Carr and Hartnett, 1996; Carr, 
1999 and 2004; McLaughlin, 1999; Eisner, 1999; Nixon, 2004; 
Elliott, 2001; McIntyre, 2005; Biesta, 2012; Hammersley, 2005; 
Oancea and Furlong, 2007; Furlong, 2013; Hostetler, 2016). Un-
like those appealing to an evidence-based applied science, they 
invite one to take a step back and reflect on the very nature 
of educational research. The main intellectual move they sug-
gest, is to start with the so-called “Aristotelian triad” (Carr, 2004; 
Biesta, 2012). Aristotle in his Ethics, chiefly, in Book VI, offers 
an unmatched treatment concerning three different intellectual 
virtues that correspond, in turn, to three different forms of kno-
wing and knowledge. The three terms are: episteme, techne and 
phronesis. In Western culture we are familiar with the first two 
terms, namely, episteme and techne. Their original concept is 
present in the words epistemology and technology, respectively. 
As Flyvberg (2001) observed, phronesis does not have anything 
analogous in our contemporary conceptual landscape. This is a 
case of what we may call “hypocognition” (Levy, 1975). Although 
we may be aware of the phenomenon under consideration, we 
are not fully able to talk about it, because we lack the proper 
word. Let us now see them one by one. 
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Episteme refers to the domain of universal and context-indepen-
dent knowledge. It is therefore chiefly theoretical and deals with 
activities such as demonstration, certification, validation (Carr, 
2004). In a more modern terminology, we would say that episte-
me concerns the law-like generalizations, regularities, patterns, 
etc. Therefore, what episteme aims for is to provide predictive 
and explanatory knowledge. In one word, episteme is rooted in 
the idea of nomothetic knowledge that we often see represen-
ted in the natural sciences. This is what Alexander Luria termed 
“classical science” (Cole et al., 2014).
The original notion of techne variously refers to terms such as 
technique, technology, technical reason, instrumental rationali-
ty. It generally refers to the domain of production or fabrication, 
bringing something into existence. If episteme is essentially the-
oretical, techne is practical in essence (Dunne, 1993).
Phronesis does not really have a precise translation. It is usually 
translated as practical wisdom (Dunne, 1993), prudence (Jullien, 
2004) or practical reason (Wiggins, 1980). For Gadamer (2004) 
it is related to moral deliberation. But this does not explain 
everything. At first approximation we may try to describe what 
phronesis is or what it refers to by comparing it with the other 
two terms. First of all, phronesis is not episteme, because, ana-
logous to techne, it is essentially practice oriented. It deals with 
the practice. It does not aim at generalization or demonstrati-
on, but it provides us with the type of orientation that we need 
when we are acting or deliberating and not in the mere sense of 
calculating (Ellett, 2012). Unlike episteme, it is not nomothetic, 
but idiographic. Phronesis does not concern universal laws, but 
the “cognizance of particular” as Aristotle put it (Ethics, 1141b 
15-17). This explains why it cannot come in the form of general 
rules, regularities, patterns, etc.
Like techne, phronesis is practical too. However, its being practi-
cal does not deal with the production of an object. Techne is 
essentially output-driven in the sense that we start from what 
we want to produce and we walk backwards to find the right 
way to achieve the desired outcome. Sometimes this is accom-
plished via trial and error to find out what works and what does 
not. Conversely, phronesis is essentially an expression of the in-
dividual himself/herself, as it deals with decisions and choices. 
Phronesis is about judgment in the sense that it deals with what 
to do in the concrete situation, here and now.
Going back to educational research, the question is to see which 
is the most suitable category. And when and how each of the 
three terms should or could be applied. The aforementioned 
educationalists claim that the evidence-based movement (or 
stance) has simply picked out the wrong category – episteme, 
when in fact it is phronesis the one that would better suit, say, 
the nature of educational research. Carr (2004) argued that 
educational research simply does not map on episteme. The 
problem with episteme is that in the context of educational re-
search (and social sciences in general) it does not refer to single 
“entities”, be it a course, a learning environment, a student, a 
class, etc., but cohorts of single entities. Let us use a rather trivial 
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and simplified example to discuss how this approach translates 
into educational research practice. Suppose that a study states 
that 70% of university students decide not to quit their studies if 
lecturers and other staff members are able to detect early signs 
of disaffection. Even if this piece of information would be actu-
ally true, it might not be of much practical help. As we can intu-
itively observe, a lecturer always deals with single students and, 
even when we know this study holds true, we may not be able to 
detect when and if our students are becoming dissatisfied. Or if 
the student right in front of us belongs to the 70% or to the 30% 
for which early detection would not do much. 
Such “facts” have created a growing body of guidelines that tea-
chers (or facilitators as they are also called) are supposed to fol-
low. The guidelines, though, are often based on the idea of “best 
practices” that can be a collection of how to do things, what 
tools to use, or how to evaluate. They are based on a particular 
challenge in a context that appear often enough, or are parts 
of the challenge and the solution can be detected in different 
contexts. The solutions become worth sharing and are re-used 
(see for example KNORK, Promoting Knowledge Work Practices 
in Education: http://knork.info/website/re-use-library/).
The major problem is that the evidence-based knowledge, 
which can indeed be assimilated to episteme, is constructed in 
such a way that it is devoid of contextual elements, which, as 
far as practitioners and the practice are concerned, are of fun-
damental importance. This, incidentally, seems to apply, for ex-
ample, to the field of Learning Analytics, in which the massive 
amount of data that can be collected may not necessarily trans-
late into real improvements (Gazulla and Leinonen, 2016). That 
is because contextual and often unique elements may not be 
factored into the “equation”. At best, statistical generalizations 
can provide some sort of heuristics, a hook to start with. Ge-
neralizations that are based on the type of experience gained 
from years of practice are very different from those that can be 
inductively generalized from the data collected. Even if the data 
amount is huge, the patterns arising from it may still not provide 
the same knowledge of how to act as broad long-term in depth 
experiences.
Phronesis seems to offer the right category to address and think 
of educational research, because phronesis points to, and is 
founded upon, a fundamental attention and sensibility to the 
particulars, the minutiae of the educational practice, which is 
therefore eminently a praxis (Carr, 2004; Biesta, 2012). Follo-
wing phenomenology and pragmatism, phronesis is also fallible, 
because it is improving all the time through practice. It is also 
temporal, situational and concrete, and based on the person’s 
experiences, where the experiences have been consciously 
valued – meaning it is responsible decision-making (Coltman, 
1998; Bernstein, 1983). So, in general, phronesis deals with 1) 
the concrete as opposed to the abstract (of episteme), 2) the 
personal as opposed to the mechanical (of the techne), 3) the 
experiences and situated decision-making opposed to formal 
generalized learning. 
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Educational design-based research
This long prelude is meant to introduce our claim that educa-
tion design-based research is a valid research approach, if it is 
positioned correctly – namely as phronesis. First we will dis-
cuss where educational design-based research sits. Educational 
design-based research is said to be an inter-disciplinary mixed 
method research approach, which is conducted “in the field”. 
As such it has been mainly interested in how to support lear-
ning rather than a general approach to education. It aims at re-
fining theories or rather models of learning and, at the same 
time, providing means to change learning practices “in the field” 
(Reimann, 2011). Wang and Hannafin describe educational de-
sign-based research as: 
a systematic but flexible methodology aimed to improve 
educational practices through iterative analysis, design, 
development, and implementation, based on collaboration 
among researchers and practitioners in real-world settings, 
and leading to contextually-sensitive design principles and 
theories. (Wang and Hannafin, 2005, p. 6) 
Generally speaking, we may claim that it is characterized by five 
main points: 1) pragmatic aims through design-oriented and in-
tervention-oriented approaches; 2) theory and practice are in-
tertwined; 3) it is interactive, iterative and flexible; 4) integrative 
and 5) pays attention to the context (Reimann, 2011).
From early on, the main aim has been to bring educational re-
search out of the narrow confinements of laboratories into the 
“field”. And for two reasons: first of all, to make it easier to ap-
ply the new ideas into actual teaching practice and, secondly, 
to enhance theories or models through actual design results in 
the field, in the classroom, or in other kinds of learning settings. 
This is a new form of educational research and it now takes pla-
ce within the authentic (or natural) learning settings, which in-
volve the cooperation of teachers and students (Brown, 1992). 
The idea to bring educational research into authentic and con-
text-dependent situations is supported by the situational and 
distributed learning approaches (Greeno, 1998; Salomon, 1993). 
Nowadays, it is even more emphasized by scholars researching 
mobile learning, such as (Sharples et al., 2005) and (FitzGerald, 
2012).
Educational design-based research is often connected and as-
sociated with the so-called “design experiments” (Brown, 1992; 
Collins, 2014), “design research” (Edelson, 2002; Lesh et al., 
2008), and “development research” (Akker, 1999). These are ba-
sed on design processes implemented into research practices. 
The idea is that design processes provide a means to innova-
te, to have iterative and incremental interactions and invite the 
participants, namely students and teachers, to actively be part 
of the whole process. The approach has grown into designing 
entirely new learning environments. As such, it is connected to 
various technological implementations. 
What is common in design-based research activities is that the 
design studies are extended over time. Without following and 
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having iterative cycles of designs, it is not possible to have mea-
ningful relations between teachers’ actions and outcomes. Itera-
tions may last weeks or even months so that the same teachers 
and students are followed from beginning to end. To be able to 
enhance the design setting, researchers need to analyse the data 
continuously and iteratively. This means that the whole research 
activity affects teachers and students’ understanding, which as 
a result changes the design setting. Researchers’ conceptions 
change too, when they observe and interview students and tea-
chers in the learning setting. Since educational design-based re-
search involves a multitude of various methods, which can be 
combined in different manners, and it includes the participants 
in the design, it is more than a collection of methods. It is in 
fact more like a framework: the models guide and intertwine 
with the design practices in authentic situations. As mentioned, 
design-based research aims at supporting the development and 
appropriation of particular forms of learning. Educational de-
sign-based research is supposed to produce concrete outcomes, 
informing best practices helping design learning environments, 
but also tasks, materials, tools, patterns of communication and 
interaction, instructional sequences (Reimann, 2011).
There is an obvious difference between the educational stu-
dies with variables and control groups typical of evidence-ba-
sed educational research, on the one hand, and educational 
design-based research studies, on the other. In educational 
design-based research, researchers do not primarily look at 
how quantitative attributes co-vary or change value over time. 
Researchers are primarily concerned with studying the event 
sequences. Which means that they focus on the “forces” that 
move the sequence forward, or any kind of resistance that hin-
ders such movement. It is not a hypothetico-deductive or induc-
tive-probabilistic type of reasoning (Hempel and Oppenheim, 
1948), but it looks for “particular causation” (Maxwell, 2004) or 
„local causality“ in contexts, as Miles and Huberman (1994) ar-
gue. This means that analysis is on the learning trajectories. For 
instance, Cobb and Gravemeijer’s developed an interpretative 
framework, which was used to describe changes, and to explain 
them in terms of abstract conceptions of learning. Referring to 
literature gives power to the arguments and maps the locational 
and specific cases in a broader framework (Cobb and Gravemei-
jer, 2008). The key point is to pay attention to the decision-ma-
king process, leading teachers and students to make conscious 
responsible judgments in particular situations for deciding what 
to do next. 
Educational design-based research – in all its different histori-
cal developments – did not emerge in direct opposition to the 
evidence-based stance. The design-based research has emerged 
as a more bottom-up approach that would engage the practice 
first, and thus making educational research more relevant for 
teachers and students, rather than more rigorous. With this in 
mind, we argue that a reflection on educational design-based 
research as a way of practical knowledge production, would be 
helpful for positioning it correctly so that its worth is apprecia-
ted.
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The general idea that we will try to pursue is that educational 
design-based research can be enriched, if it is properly under-
stood in the light of the concept of phronesis, rather than as an 
example of epistemic science (episteme), or as an approach to 
produce something – be it a learning environment, a learning 
device, etc. (techne). We may identify therefore two issues that 
the notion of phronesis helps to clarify. The first is related to the 
notion of intervention and the second is related to the idea of 
theory and the role that it may have.
The notion of intervention and the centrality that it holds in 
educational design-based research points to the importance of 
practice. However, the practical nature of educational research 
can easily give in to an interpretation of the word “practical” 
rooted in the notion of techne. So, an intervention can be seen 
as a product or means for the design. By explicit reference to 
the notion of phronesis as an alternative stance, we claim that 
intervention and its design is simply an ongoing and open-ended 
process, which engages teachers (and potentially students), and 
as such it resists codification into a formula or technique. More 
specifically, we will argue that intervention is fundamentally lin-
ked to the full engagement with the practice and it is therefore 
rooted in teachers’ professional judgment (Section 2).
On the basis of this particular interpretation of intervention, 
we present a corresponding idea assigning a specific role to the 
term “theory” (Section 3). We will argue that theory in the phro-
netic sense cannot be mistaken for the nomothetic science sup-
plying law-like type of knowledge. By stressing the importance 
of personal previous experience, we will argue that theory can 
be viewed in the activity of sharing and making sense of the si-
tuation along with its articulation.
The notion of intervention
The centrality of intervention in educational design-ba-
sed research
The question that we are going to address in this section: is tur-
ning away from a typical laboratory type of setting to a real one, 
a clear departure from the idea of applied science? In order to 
answer to this question, we go back to the Aristotelian triad. 
More specifically, we are going to present a discussion about the 
notion of intervention by making a comparison between a tech-
ne-based approach and a phronesis-based one.
Educational design-based research has contributed more than 
other strands of educational research to bringing light to, and 
thus problematizes, the natural/authentic settings of learning in 
education. This more naturalistic approach, so to say, brought re-
search out of the rigid confinements of laboratories to focus on 
the complexity of the actual learning environments. Such rene-
wed interest in what we may call “the ecologies of learning” led 
to the re-consideration of the way in which intervention can be 
conceived, both theoretically and practically. Instead of investi-
gating learning of un-contextualized tasks in a laboratory, which 
is an environment artificially set up to observe the behaviour 
3.0
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of a restricted number of variables, educational design-based 
research directs its effort to inquiring into how actual learning 
environments can be designed to support the actual learning 
processes. 
A valuable example of this approach is provided by Brown (1992). 
As early as 1992 she argued that, as a design scientist, her ma-
jor concern was to “attempt to engineer innovative educational 
environments and simultaneously conduct experimental studies 
of those innovations” (p. 141). Such experimental studies were 
called by Collins design experiments (Collins, 2014). What is in-
teresting to note here is that design experiments are not sim-
ply meant to passively observe what is going on in the learning 
setting, as the traditional notion of experiment would suggest. 
They are meant to put to the test, in real situations, ideas con-
cerning how to manipulate actual learning ecologies.
This view takes seriously that learning processes are distributed 
(Hutchins, 1995) and situated, and that the learning setting is 
not cognitively inert, but it is already structured as a cognitive 
niche [reference removed for blind review]. This means that a 
particular part of the general environment one lives in locally 
affords certain actions while potentially hiding and constraining 
others. So, bringing the notion of the learning environment to 
the fore of our attention means having the opportunity – at least 
in theory – to have a say about how learning settings could be 
specifically designed so as to afford or facilitate learning. Along 
similar lines, for instance, Barab and Squire argued that “the 
research moves beyond simply observing and actually involves 
systematically engineering these context” (Barab and Squire, 
2004, p. 2).
One may interpret the contributions as leading to a conception 
of intervention, which is fundamentally “engineering-centred”. 
For instance, Cobb and colleagues (2003, p. 9) argued that par-
ticular forms of learning can actually be “engineered” (Cobb et 
al., 2003, p. 9). This remark seems to suggest that intervention 
is somehow interpreted through the lens of techne and thus it 
misses the importance of acting and deliberating, which consti-
tute the pillars of a phronetic interpretation. 
A voice critical of the techne-based stance, has been recently rai-
sed by Richter and Allert (2014). They have argued that the whole 
notion of designing interventions might be biased towards what 
they called “the engineering model”. Designing interventions is 
unproblematically accepted as a linear sequence of steps, such 
as analysis, design, evaluation and revision. This sequence is rei-
terated cyclically so as to achieve a satisfying result, a result that 
reaches a trade-off between what one had in mind and what 
actually turned out to be achievable. Specifically, they list three 
main potentially problematic issues. First off, the “engineering 
model” is simply static. Problems are assumed to be given and 
well-defined, awaiting to be solved. Researchers are therefore 
solutionists, they are providers of solutions without apparent 
concerns regarding the way in which the problems themselves 
are formulated. Secondly, a clear separation between means 
and ends is assumed. This implies that issues concerning valu-
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es are not necessarily linked to the actual practice of designing 
interventions, which is viewed essentially as a technical issue. 
Thirdly, designing interventions can be reduced to “a series of 
well-described, discrete, rational, and structured methodologi-
cal steps” (p. 3).
In our terminology we may re-describe the three points raised 
by Richter and Allert the following way. First of all, the idea that 
there is a problem and the problem is awaiting to be solved 
refers essentially to bringing about directly and purposefully 
a specific outcome desired and/or expected. Secondly, as the 
main purpose is to make something, then there is a clear sepa-
ration between what is made and the maker. This has a major 
consequence: that the maker steps outside the process, as they 
become a mere executor of a procedure composed of certain 
methodological steps to follow – a technique, which eventually 
leads to the desired outcome (Dunne, 1993). In this case, we see 
how techne and episteme come together, as the technique to 
use would be the one identified through “scientific means”.
From our point of view, Richter and Allert bring out elements 
describing the shortcomings that characterize a reductionist 
vision on intervention that conflates the practical meaning of 
phronesis with that of techne. Techne informs what we call a 
stance, which focuses on the production or fabrication of so-
mething. Provocatively, we may say that intervention equates 
to the designing of a product, in the sense that it aims to pro-
duce something. This is highly problematic when it comes to le-
arning and more general to education. Unlike techne, phronesis 
introduces a different way of looking at learning and educati-
on. Phronesis is not practical in the sense of “being applied” or 
“applicable”. It is just practical. As phronesis does not deal with 
the fabrication of something, it does not refer to the capacity 
of making. Rather, phronesis identifies a class of situations in 
which a person (or a group of persons) tries to deliberate and 
act well (Carr, 2004). In the educational context, this means that 
a teacher is not simply a kind of technician who manipulates 
the learning scene by following alleged best practices. A teacher 
is called to act in specific situations that are characterized by a 
number of layers tied together by the general goal of forming 
future citizens able to act responsibly (Biesta, 2012).
The shift from fabrication (or making) to acting and deliberati-
on describes a mode of engagement that takes seriously and 
consequently faces the uncertainty characterizing the practical 
matters of supporting and enhancing learning (Biesta, 2012; Pe-
ters, 1966). Techne is the proper approach when the outcome of 
action is known in advance. As such it orients action before one 
engages the world. This simply implies that techne is a mode 
of behaviour that cannot operate under condition of uncertain-
ty. Indeed, we are not assuming that uncertainty is not anyhow 
present in the fabrication of objects. We may even say that the 
essence of craftsmanship is precisely being able to deal with un-
predictable situations, that is, problems as they arise (see Krist-
jánsson, 2005 for a discussion). At the same time we are not 
denying that we can reasonably say that teachers are trying to 
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make good citizens out of their students. What we are arguing 
is that the type of uncertainty characterizing learning and in 
general education deals with the fact that students cannot be 
reduced to mere objects of manipulation. Their subjectivity is 
fundamentally in the becoming. In this sense the outcome can-
not be pre-determined.    By assuming that outcomes cannot be 
known in advance, teachers and students cease to be mere ma-
kers, detached subjects that execute a pre-ordinated plan. The 
uncertainty of the outcome deprives the maker of the so-called 
“bird’s eye view”, which is necessary to ensure that the process 
will lead to the desired outcome by selecting and then imple-
menting, as Richter and Allert pointed out, “discrete, rational, 
and structured methodological steps”. In other words, uncer-
tainty forces them to step into the activity itself and thus aban-
doning the reassuring position of the technician (Jullien, 2004) 
– or the solutionist. The outcome, which should be brought into 
existence through the application of a technique, is dynamic; it 
changes during the process, based on what occurs. Therefore 
pre-set outcomes can no longer orient and inform action. It does 
not mean that action is aimless. The aim of forming future citi-
zens remains, but it cannot be directly linked to a specific out-
come known beforehand. Conversely, it will take shape in due 
course, and deals with what is eventually a developmental and 
educational challenge. This has an important consequence for 
the notion of intervention. Shifting from a techne-based con-
ception to one that is phronesis-based, helps see that the design 
of educational interventions for learning is in fact open-ended. 
In addition, it helps identify who is the agent of intervention and 
how to ground this. This is particularly relevant, as the agents 
change during the process. The trigger of intervention may be 
a researcher, followed by teachers, after which teachers may be 
replaced by students as the agents of intervention.
Since its earliest days, educational design-based research was 
fairly committed to taking seriously that education and learning 
happen in specific settings. Educational design-based research 
has also affirmed the importance of practitioners’ engagement 
in the very process of knowledge production (Juuti and Lavonen, 
2012), as well as students (Missingham and Matthews, 2014). 
This is a significant difference to the evidence-based stance we 
have sketched out above, which relegates practitioners to a po-
sition of mere implementers of some sort of guidelines “appro-
ved” by educational scientists (see the experiential account 
provided by Bossman, 2015). Educational design-based rese-
arch, values and makes use of various forms of participatory/
collaborative research, forms of research in which practitioners, 
namely, teachers, are actively involved in doing research and de-
sign alongside researchers. 
The idea of full engagement makes all this even more radical. If 
we renounce the idea of techne, then intervention cannot be se-
parated from teachers’ full engagement in and with the educa-
tional practice. Such an engagement results in a form of inter-
vention that can be better described as (although not entirely 
reducible to) a continuous activity of tinkering with what comes 
in handy in the here and now of the practice. By tinkering, we 
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mean that teachers have to keep adjusting their intervention ac-
cording to the necessities emerging from real-time interactions 
with students, in a loop that potentially never comes to an end. 
In this sense, interventions can never be entirely designed, let 
alone be interpreted as objects or applications. Rather, objects 
as well as applications are what teachers may come to tinker 
with.
Intervention as a phronetic space: the importance of pro-
fessional judgment and experience
On a more abstract level, intervention can be viewed more as 
a phronetic space. That is, a space in which teachers exercise 
professional judgment (Elliott, 2001; Kinsella and Pitman, 2012). 
Professional judgment cannot be mistaken for the type of ab-
stract, generalized and context-independent evidence-based 
expertise, which is often advocated by some researchers and 
policy-makers (see e.g. Australian awards for university teaching 
in Devlin and Smarawickrema, 2009). Conversely, professional 
judgment is what teachers are called on to apply, as they should 
often respond to situations as they arise without the opportuni-
ty (and time) to, suspend judgment and ponder about what they 
should do next (Hostetler, 2016). 
In this sense, professional judgment is related to perceiving, 
which is a much more immediate and holistic response than for 
instance pondering, considering, meditating, weighing – all at-
tached in one way or another to reflection (and the idea of the 
reflective practitioner). Therefore, Hostletler (2016) talks about 
judgment-in-action as opposed to reflection-in-action (Schön, 
1984). Judgment-in-action provides a summary appraisal of a 
situation, and it is inherently linked to reading situations correc-
tly, having a finger on the pulse, developing insight and caring. 
Ultimately, it is taking full responsibility for the decision.
So, even when we acknowledge the potential role that a no-
mothetic approach to educational research may have for the 
practice, a teacher cannot be viewed as a mere executor of a sort 
of script that has been empirically validated. The reason is not 
dependent on the truthfulness of the evidence-based type of 
knowledge (episteme) that was produced. The reason is that the 
teacher’s professional judgment will always play a crucial role in 
order to match law-like generalizations to “particular contingen-
cies” (Carr, 1999). This is the case in all practical domains. It is 
even more crucial in education, where teachers, face the kind of 
uniqueness, uncertainty and value conflict (McLaughlin, 1999), 
which require elasticity and discretion, which the whole notion 
of professional judgment actually refers to (Hostetler, 2016).
Professional judgment does not come out of a vacuum, though. 
Professional judgment depends on the first hand experience of 
particulars. Aristotle makes an interesting example that can be 
analogically applied to teachers as well. Let us suppose that a 
person knows that “light flesh foods are digestible and wholeso-
me”. Aristotle fairly observes that, even if this rule were true, it 
3.2
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might not be of practical help, because what is crucial is to know 
what kinds are light. Aristotle continues saying that for a person 
to stay healthy it is sufficient to know that chicken is wholeso-
me. As paradoxically as it may sound, we do not need to know 
the light flesh foods are digestible and wholesome. “Chicken is 
wholesome” is not nomothetic knowledge - knowledge of regu-
larities. It is knowledge of particulars and as such it can only be 
acquired via experience.
Aristotle’s example is quite close to the one we have made abo-
ve. We may know that 70% of university students decide not to 
quit their study if lecturers and other staff members are able 
to detect early signs of disaffection. This piece of (nomothetic) 
knowledge might simply be of no practical value, if the teacher is 
not familiar with concrete instances of signs of disaffection - let 
alone early ones. The question to ask would then be: what does 
this mean in the specific context a teacher is actually facing? 
This is not a kind of sterile semantic exercise about words and 
their meaning. It is a question pointing to the fact that “what 
this means” cannot be separated from actual experiences, ac-
tual cases. So, what experience means and refers to is this par-
ticular student, this particular class, this particular group of col-
leagues, this particular event, the particular feelings, thoughts, 
reflections that this particular situation has triggered, particular 
anxieties. Experience is also the experience teachers have with 
particular theories, approaches, models, which might be indeed 
rigorously crafted pieces of evidence-based educational science.
Flyvbjerg (2001 and 2006) argued that knowledge of particulars 
(or context-dependent knowledge, as he called it) is fundamen-
tal in order to move from being a beginner to being an expert. 
Those that are called experts - he claimed - are not those who 
know the right rules (provided that such a thing like the right 
rule exists). Conversely, one’s “expertise” is composed of several 
thousand concrete cases, which would give a person, say, “the 
measure of man”. However, this body of cases should not be vie-
wed as a body of explicit knowledge that can be transmitted as it 
is. Rather, it is the kind of knowledge that is tacitly enacted and 
transmitted and that provides the basis for applying judgment in 
professional contexts.
So, at a more general level, we may argue that the justificati-
on for a teacher’s application of professional judgment can only 
be built and drawn from “a bank of stories, analogs, and me-
taphors”, as Hostetler pointed out. (2016: p. 10). This is a very 
important point, because it opens up a different conception or, 
better use of theory, which is our topic under consideration for 
the next section.
Research Design and Methods
A weakened form of theory?
Educational design-based research is attached to the idea of 
evaluation, which is usually considered as a separate track from 
research. Evaluation studies is a well-established discipline that 
can be defined as the systematic acquisition and assessment of 
4.0
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information to provide useful feedback about some objects (Da-
vidson, 2005; Sanders, 1994; Scriven, 1991). Data collected have 
the main function to provide the empirical basis to formulate 
judgments about the merit, worth, usefulness and/or significan-
ce of a given object (or set of objects) that could be, for example, 
a project, a course, a policy, or more generally an intervention 
– something we do in order to change and improve a situation. 
Educational design-based research, though, slightly differs from 
traditional evaluation because of its theoretical commitments. It 
aspires to develop theoretical claims (Cobb et al., 2003). 
The main idea of the “theory” that was developed by the pro-
ponents of educational design-based research is that we can put 
our interventions to the test and derive principles, guidelines or 
even best practices, which can inform how to better design our 
interventions. Since educational design-based research takes se-
riously the real context in which learning actually takes place, 
the commitment to theory is about finding out what works and 
what does not and under what conditions. 
In a way the notion of theory that is explicitly envisaged has we-
aker connotations if compared with the image of educational 
research advocated by evidence-based supporters. In this sense 
it seems that in educational-design based research the question 
about theory is more open to different interpretations. Indeed, 
principles can be considered as part of a theory that aspires to 
be applied in the sense that we described above. It provides a 
“scientific” foundation for action.
Although this is a perspective that has its appeal, what we are 
going to do in this last section is to take a different perspective 
informed by the notion of phronesis. If the success of an inter-
vention rests on the teachers’ ability to apply professional judg-
ment, and professional judgment is rooted in their experience, 
then we may argue that it is precisely in relation to experience 
that the whole notion of theory may acquire an important me-
aning. So, in the more phronetic sense of the word, theory may 
not refer exclusively to principles - no matter how weak they 
are. The word “theory” may deal with the way in which experi-
ence can be generalized without losing the commitment to re-
presenting particulars – what Luria called “romantic science” as 
opposed to classic science (Cole et al., 2014).
A phronetic conception of theory
It is not here the right place to reproduce the discussion around 
phronetic research (see Flyvberg, 2001 and Kemmis 2010 for a 
critical discussion). We are not actually endorsing any particular 
version of phronetic research. In this section our main goal is to 
identify a conception of theory inspired by the notion of phrone-
sis that would fit with the overall goals of educational design-ba-
sed research. Indeed, we are aware that the kind of theory we 
are endorsing inevitably belong to the academic discourse. In 
this regard we agree with Flyvberg, who see (phronetic) rese-
archers as fundamentally separated from practitioners. In Flyv-
berg’s terminology we do not necessarily see ourselves as action 
researchers (2001). 
4.2
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Our starting point is to observe that the word “theory” tends to 
denote the type of intellectual effort that aims at the identifica-
tion of invariances, patterns, predictions, generalizations along 
with models, methods, and principles. This would fit with the 
notion of episteme, as already noted. However, this approach 
is rooted in the inability to see the same very term – theory – 
phronetically. In our view the term “theory” may refer to our 
attempts to scout, articulate and therefore communicate the 
particulars that appear in the practitioners’ own experience.
Flyvbjerg, in the last decade or so, has been one of the main ad-
vocates of the importance of case studies in the social sciences 
(2006). One specific point that he has raised concerns the crucial 
importance that critical cases can have. A case tells a story. But 
the story may have a broader meaning, as it may be exemplar of 
a concept, a form of understanding, etc., which we would better 
take into consideration. So, our theoretical efforts materialize in 
the presentation as well as the selection of an otherwise messy 
bundle of events. The selection is theoretically pregnant with a 
number of elements (concepts, perspectives, frameworks, even 
methods) and it may include a variety of ways of presenting the 
“data” themselves, which may include art-based forms such as 
such as ethnodrama (Saldaña, 2005) or ethnotheater (Saldaña, 
2011) and even in comics form (Sousanis, 2015).
Phronetic theory may also include generalizations, but of a diffe-
rent kind. Robert Stake captures this aspect when he argues for 
the so called “naturalistic generalizations” (Stake and Trumbull, 
1982; Stake, 1995). Unlike statistical ones, naturalistic genera-
lizations engage the potential reader (for instance, teachers, 
students researchers and other practitioners concerned with 
education) in a sort of dialogue, in which he or she tries to relate 
the story, the case, the ethnographical account presented to his/
her own. 
What is worth adding here is that the more traditional form of 
theory as episteme, which we derive from the natural scien-
ces, would not necessarily be rejected. Such an interpretation 
of theory may be re-interpreted within a phronetic conceptu-
al frame as an attempt to articulate experience, which prioriti-
zes, for instance, what is in common, rather than what it is not, 
what appears as pattern-like, rather than peculiar and unique 
to the situation at hand. So, for example, models of learning, 
which might be well rooted in the episteme tradition, could be 
of practical importance, as long as the practitioners would try 
to make sense of them in their own practice. In this regard, our 
phronetic account does not rule out the possibility that a law-li-
ke type of theory can actually be practically relevant. However, it 
is not relevant in the sense of guiding the practice independently 
from particular contexts and teachers’ application of judgment.
More generally, we posit that what phronesis looks at is more 
the way in which theory – in all its different forms – can actual-
ly be used by practitioners in the attempt to enlarge, broaden 
and deepen the basis of one’s experience in his/her profession. 
Which may also entail that a piece of theory may not be use-
ful at all, independently from its rigor. Our phronetic account 
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therefore points to the use of theories rather than providing a 
prescriptive account based on some epistemologies concerning 
how theory should look. Experience is an experience of some 
particulars. Phronesis supports the issues found problematic by 
traditional research approaches. These are framing and seeing 
the worth of 1) the concrete as opposed to the abstract (of epi-
steme), 2) the personal as opposed to the mechanical (of the 
techne). 3) the experiences and situated decision-making oppo-
sed to formal generalized learning.
Concluding remarks: Issues and aspirations
The effort that we have made is meant to provide an alternati-
ve phronesis perspective on educational design-based research 
rooted in the notion of phronesis. The main intent was to show 
how the notion of phronesis – along with its recent theoretical 
developments in the specific field of educational research – can 
provide a solid frame for talking about crucial issues related to 
educational design-based research and educational research as 
such. Indeed, what we have presented is a preliminary attempt 
to specify how a phronetic stance towards educational de-
sign-based research may look, and what kind of topics it might 
help bring out. Specifically, we have focused on two issues: the 
notion of intervention and that of theory. What we had in mind 
was to show how the notion of phronesis may help problema-
tize issues and questions that remain in the background or are 
simply not sufficiently discussed. 
Concerning intervention, we have argued that a potential prob-
lem is how educational design-based research might be reduced 
– either tacitly or not – to the making of an object, be it a lear-
ning environment, an application, a piece of software. Conver-
sely, we have tried to point out that the agent of intervention 
is the teacher along with students. It is in the learning settings 
where intervention takes place and it is therefore intimately re-
lated to the teachers’ professional judgment. It is the ability to 
read the situation and decide in the here and now what to do 
and how to do it. It is based on the concrete contextual occur-
rences rather than abstract rules.
Focusing on professional judgment meant also to re-describe 
the kind of conception that we may hold about “theory” as well 
as the type of more theoretical work researchers can be en-
gaged with. If professional judgment is central in practices like 
education, then it is the sharing of teachers as well as students’ 
personal experiences in the form of stories and narratives that 
takes central stage rather than generalized principles. This is 
not indeed neutral from a theoretical perspective, because the 
selection, composition and presentation of a case requires an ef-
fort, which does not exempt researchers from making theoreti-
cal claims and thinking up alternative ways of looking at learning 
and teaching. Although a story or narrative does not provide a 
law-like type of knowledge, they may come to be exemplars, ca-
ses in point, which may challenge teachers as well as encourage 
them to enlarge their own repertoire of experiences vicariously.
5.0
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